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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIRED THE LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT
FIRST SOUTHWESTERN^ NON-EXPERT AFFIDAVITS SATISFIED
WYCALIS.
RJW Media has not waived its right to appeal the trial court's elevation of non-

expert affidavits to expert status and thereby invoke Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah,
780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). According to Civil Rule 56, summary judgment is
appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c); Berenda v. Langford, 914
P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996). Therefore, entitlement to summary judgment is a question of
law, and the appellate court reviews "whether the trial court erred in applying governing
law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of
material fact." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 50. Because entitlement to summary judgment is a
question of law, the appellate court should "accord no deference to the trial court's
resolution of the legal issues presented." Id.
It is well settled law in Utah that expert testimony is generally required to establish
the standard of care required in negligence cases. See Jensen v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 2003
UT 51, Tl 96, 82 P.3d 1076 (stating that a party is "required to prove the standard of care
through an expert witness who is qualified to testify about that standard."); Wycalis, 780
P.2d at 826 n.8 (stating that "expert testimony must ordinarily be presented to establish
the standard of care."); Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) (stating that the
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general rule requires expert testimony to establish a standard of case, except where an
expert opinion "could throw little light on the subject."). The only exception to the rule
requiring expert testimony to establish a standard of care is where the standard is within
the "common knowledge and experience of the layman," Jensen, 2003 UT 51 at ^f 96, and
expert testimony would do little to elucidate that standard. Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 352; see
also Daniel Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 642 P.2d 1086, 1087
(Nev. 1982) (stating that expert testimony exception applies where an understanding of
the standard involved "does not involve esoteric knowledge" of the particular profession
at issue). The exception to expert testimony has been applied only where the duty
breached is so obvious that it is within the common understanding of the general public;
for instance, when a surgical instrument is left inside a patient's body. See Nixdorf, 612
at 352; see also Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, 871 P.2d 570, 574-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(the need to install emergency sprinkler systems in a retirement community where inroom smoking was permitted and many residents were non-ambulatory was a matter
within the common understanding of laypersons); Hilton Hotels, 642 P.2d at 1087 (expert
testimony was not required to define a standard of care where a professional surveyor
misread accurate building plans).
The trustee obligations of a title officer are not within the knowledge and
experience of a layperson. Accordingly, the limited "certain exceptions" to the general
expert testimony rule do not apply in this case, and First Southwestern was required to
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establish that it did not breach its duty under the circumstances as a matter of law. First
Southwestern admits that it did not offer expert testimony as to the standard of care, and
First Southwestern concedes that the Affidavits do not establish a standard of care for a
trustee:
The Affidavits do not constitute expert testimony because
neither affidavit offered an opinion as to the standard of care
or stated whether or not the standard of care was breached.
(Brief of Appellee at 23-24).
Despite acknowledging that it did not offer the Affidavits as designated expert
testimony, First Southwestern attempts to create a middle ground by arguing that Wycalis
and Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prod., Inc., 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), allow a party
to factually demonstrate the standard of care in an industry by simply offering testimony
by a worker in that industry, thereby eliminating the need for designated expert
testimony. (Brief of Appellee at 16-17, 23). First Southwestern cites to language in a
footnote in Ortiz that quotes Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co, 711 P.2d 250 (Utah
1985), to support its argument. (Brief of Appellee at 16-17, 23). However, the quoted
language from Wessel actually stands for the proposition that an expert generally must
work in the trade or profession about which he or she is testifying; Wessel does not hold
that testimony by a worker or employee in an industry can substitute for designated
expert testimony regarding a requisite standard of care in an industry. See Wessel, 711
P.2d at 253 (holding that testimony by an expert employed in another industry qualifies
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as expert testimony as to standard of care only where the standard of care is identical for
both professions).
Contrary to First Southwestern's argument, Wycalls and Ortiz do not eliminate the
need to introduce expert testimony in order to factually establish an industry standard of
care. Indeed, that proposition would virtually eliminate the need to ever designate
experts pursuant to Civil Rule 26's requirements in negligence cases. Rather, Wycalls
and Ortiz simply uphold the traditional standard in Utah negligence cases, and that
standard requires expert testimony to establish a factual standard of care in an industry
unless the standard is so universally self-evident that a layperson is already aware of the
applicable standard of care. Because no expert exception applies to First Southwestern's
standard of care, the non-expert Affidavits provided by First Southwestern cannot
factually establish its standard of care.
Given that no qualified standard of care in the industry evidence was offered, the
trial court clearly misapplied governing law in holding that First Southwestern was
entitled to summary judgment under Wycalis. In its September 22, 2006 Ruling and
Order, the trial court held that "Wycalls therefore left the door open for the probability
that summary judgment may be appropriate where a case involved uncontroverted
standard-of-the-industry evidence." (R. at 528). However, the Affidavits did not even
purport to offer expert opinion as to the standard of care, and the Affidavits were not
qualified as expert standard of the industry evidence creating a fixed-at-law standard of
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care. (Brief of Appellee at 24). Nevertheless, the trial court elevated the Affidavits to
expert status sua sponte, and held that no factual issues remained before the court. (R. at
528). This was an improper application of Wycalis.
II.

CIVIL RULE 56 DOES NOT REQUIRE RJW MEDIA TO FILE
COUNTER AFFIDAVITS TO WARD OFF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IF
FIRST SOUTHWESTERN MISSED THEMARK IN ITS OWN
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE.
First Southwestern asserts that it was incumbent upon RJW Media to file affidavits

opposing First Southwestern's non-expert Affidavits at summary judgment. But First
Southwestern overlooks the simple truth that "it is not always required that a party proffer
affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in order to avoid judgment
against him." Olwell v. Clark 658 P.2d 585, 586 (Utah 1982). As the Utah Supreme
Court has noted,
Rule 56(e) states specifically that a response in opposition to
a motion must be supported by affidavits or other documents
only in order to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of
fact for trial. However, "[w]here the party opposed to the
motion submits no documents in opposition, the moving party
may be granted summary judgment only i f appropriate,' that
is, if he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, summary judgment should be entered only "if
appropriate," regardless of whether a party submits affidavits in support or in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also UTAH R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Viewing First Southwestern's pleadings, the non-expert Affidavits, and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of RJW Media, the question

5

remains unanswered by the trial court as to whether First Southwestern's duty was fixed
at law. The fact that First Southwestern has now admitted that it did not offer the
Affidavits of Smith and Davis as expert testimony only reinforces the need for remand.
{See Brief of Appellee at 23-24). RJW Media appeals the trial court's decision to elevate
those unqualified affidavits to the level of proof necessary to support summary judgment
under Wycalis.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons and authority cited supra, RJW Media requests that this Court
reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of First Southwestern and remand this
case to the district court to allow RJW Media the opportunity to prove its breach of duty
claim before a trier of fact in open court.
Respectfully Submitted this 28th day of November, 2007.
WRONA LAW OFFICES, P.C.

Joseph E. Wrona
Bastiaan K. Coebergh
Tyler S. Foutz
Attorneys for Appellant/Cross Appellee
RJW Media, Inc.
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